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Abstract 
Investigating on the reasons of British overseas investments (1850-1913) we analyze two 
different approaches on data and we conclude that they are not different from a stochastic 
view. Inquiring on ‘push’ approach, we find that exists a negative correlation between 
GDP and overseas investments where the former cause the latter. The link between 
monetary events and colonialism highlights India’s role as a reserve of bullions. In this 
way, British capital was able to complete its natural cycle, draining money for future 
foreign investments. This improve the theory by introducing the monetary element in 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ hypothesis as well. 
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1 Introduction 
From the classical work of J. A. Hobson1 (1902) on British imperialism, several 
economists and economic historians focused on the reasons of UK overseas investments 
over the nineteenth and twentieth century till I World War. We can group the theories 
explaining the reasons of British overseas investments in two main categories: the push 
theories, according to which capital was pushed out by domestic elements, and the pull 
theories, based on a main idea of funds outflow, due to superior investment opportunities 
abroad. 
One of the most important advisor of the push theory is C. K. Hobson2. He guessed that 
the unbalanced income distribution generated an excess of saving that was not absorbed 
in domestic market and so flowed out abroad. This hypothesis is based on a deficit of the 
aggregated demand due to a low consumption level which depressed the expected 
profitability of internal investment planes, pushing out the capitals. Kennedys’ analysis3 
based on other arguments. He related the flow of overseas investments to low risk profile 
of  British investors. Domestic investments were highly risky because of lack of 
information and for inefficient organization of domestic capital market, especially the 
bank one. This intuition is supported by a comparison with what happened in the same 
period in Germany where a bank based capital market was the instrument to finance 
enterprises and locate saving. Differently, British enterprises had not comparable 
conditions at home; only public administrations and corporations managing public 
utilities, had easy access to capital market4.  
The most influential exponent of the pull theory is Edelstein5 (1976). He explains the 
outflow of British capital considering the highest foreign returns in respect of the 
domestic ones. However Edelstein did not exclude the push hypothesis, showing that in 
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Great Britain part of the saving excess flew out because of the exceptionally low returns 
of British securities, mainly during 1897-1909.  
Both theories are satisfactory and could be improved by introducing new focuses and 
discussion elements. The problem of foreign investments attractiveness and of low 
domestic returns is solved in the capital proclivity moving where its yields are relatively 
higher. The differential between home and foreign returns sets out the direction by which 
capital will move. Such a differential embodies the pull and the push hypothesis, making 
difficult to establish if domestic returns were too much low or foreign ones extremely 
high. In order to support the push theories, we could refer to the long run relative fall of 
British economy. This was the structural reason determining the capital movement away 
from Great Britain. A further element to be analyzed is the role of international monetary 
context. Monetary stability is a relevant component in the capital moving process from an 
economy to another. First the international bimetallism and then the achievement of Gold 
standard ensured such a stability lowering the risk of capital losses. Related  to monetary 
the point is the British colonial policy which found in the overseas investments an useful 
device for draining money, especially by Indian economy.  
According to the purposes of this work, the first step to be taken is to choose data 
concerning the overseas investments, considering several reconstructions based on 
different methods. Thereafter analysis can run through the relative fall of British economy 
and its impact on capital outflows, and then through the role of monetary stability, finally 
considering how Great Britain drained money by Indian colonies  by mean of the 
overseas investments. 
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2 The Overseas Investments accounting. 
The choice of the database of British capital movements abroad involves several 
difficulties related to the nature of data reconstruction, covered range of time and 
availability of series in real values.  
The available datasets mainly are built on two research methods, the indirect one, or 
residual, and  the direct one. 
Reconstruction through indirect method consists in aggregating current account balances 
excluding bullion movements. The main hypothesis states that such balances represents  
the potential demand of British investors for foreign assets. To accomplish an estimation 
of abroad invested capital stock, it needs to be assumed a lack of gains or losses in capital 
stock and an irrelevance of amount of repatriated funds. The international stability of 
gold-silver ratio until early 1870s and the adoption of pure Gold Standard from 1873 
onward warranted the first hypothesis. The second one is sustained by Imlah(1958) who 
guesses that, until I World War, it solely happened an adjustments in the geographical 
composition of British funds already invested abroad. As this method deals with current 
account balances, reconstruction consistency  of these items determines the estimated 
overseas investments reliability. Only from 1853 we have official data on balance trade, 
included re-exports, provided by Annual Statement of Trade of the UK with Foreign 
Countries and British Possessions. Another relevant issue is treating of property income 
from abroad. 
Pioneers of the indirect method were Seyd6 (1876) and Shaw-Lefevre7 (1878), but their 
reconstructions are limited to few years. The first systematic attempt is due to C. K. 
Hobson(1963). He covered a wider period from 1870 to 1913. The new introduced 
elements are the inclusion of bullions and the approximated quantification of property 
income from abroad and shipment incomes.  
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The most significant contribution to reconstruction of British overseas investments 
estimation through indirect method is due to the impressive work of Imlah(1958). His 
research cover almost a century, 1816-1913. His originality lives in methodological 
intuition for which Imlah is induced to include bullion movements in current account 
balances. He guesses that, from middle nineteenth century, bullions movements are even 
more attributable to capital movements rather than goods ones. Moreover he underlines 
the increasing importance of interest and dividend balances from early 1870s onward, 
testifying the relevance of Britain exported capital flows. The robustness of Imlah 
estimations is confirmed by Feinstein8 (1972). Although a different handling of bullion 
movements exists, the two reconstructions depict same time path of overseas investments. 
Feinstein considers these movements as a part of capital movements but he excludes them 
from computation; however his statement does not significantly modify the quantification 
of capital outflow provided by Imlah.  
Differently from the residual method, the direct one try to estimate the foreign assets held 
by British investors starting from the variations of distinct elements of this wealth. The 
questions raised by this methodology range from problematical collection of data on 
overseas financial assets held by citizens and institutions, to uncertain definition of wealth 
stock to get, in second step, the pace, and to impossibility of singling out if the financial 
flows managed in the City were British investors’ own or they simply passed through the 
major financial market of that epoch. Finally this kind of estimation does not count for 
investments outside official financial market, as direct investments. Just this logical 
distinction between portfolio investments and direct investments is, at the same time, 
value and limit of the most notable direct reconstruction due to Simon9 (1967a). The 
author focused on new issues of assets taken from Investor Monthly Manual and The 
Stock Exchange Year Book, Burdett’s Official Intelligence. In his analysis overseas 
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investments coincide in foreign portfolio investments while foreign direct investments, as 
constitutions, acquisitions or participations of enterprises are not included. Simon’s 
analysis is  rigorous and accurate for the new issues, representing the best estimation with 
direct method for this component of the overseas investments, but it is not complete for 
the lack of  foreign direct investments10. 
 
3 The two approaches in a comparative perspective. 
Recognizing, from previous section, the prevalence of indirect method, we need to select 
a choosing criterion between the best estimations for each method, the Imlah and Simon 
series, to get the fit one according to our purposes of long run analysis.  
From graphical shape of time series it arises that, though methodological divergences, the 
two estimations converge into common value in the last years and they are correlated  
over the whole period, 1870-1913. Solely in 1890-1900 simple correlation is weak. 
 
Figure1. 
 
Stochastic analysis, statistically more robust, confirms what  simple correlation outcrops. 
The two time series are generated by the same process. Both are first order integrated 
series11 and follow an autoregressive first order process as we can get by ARIMA 
identification using the reduction method proposed by Hendry(1997).  
Imlah12 =  4.3 + 0.916AR(1)                                                                              (1) 
R2c = 0.824 
Simon13 = 4.5 + 0.867AR(1)                                                                              (2) 
R2c = 0.697 
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In additional, conducing the Wald test on autoregressive coefficients, they result 
statistically not different ( see Appendix 1 table 1). 
From a stochastic point of view it is not different use one of the two series. Other issues 
advice  to choose the Imalh estimations in advance. First, time series availability in real 
values, proposed  by Deane14 (1968) and built on Imlah price index, second, the fullness 
of indirect method including foreign direct investments, and finally the length of time 
series covering a longer period, 1820-1913. 
 
4 British relative fall as basis of overseas investments dynamics. 
The growth of Great Britain is a classical field of work for economic historians and 
economists. Several advances have been performed from the pioneer work of Deane and 
Cole15 (1962). Crafts16 (1983) and Crafts and Hurley17 (1993) threw new light on 
effectiveness of British economic growth before 1830. Especially in the early thirties of 
nineteenth century British per capita GDP grew at annual rate of 0.45% slightly higher 
than it did in 1780-1801 (0.41%). The estimations from 1830 onward are less revised and  
the common idea of a GDP growth rate higher than the period before1830 prevailed.  
In a long run analysis the central issue is the loss of world leadership of Great Britain. 
This falling is relative to other main economies. This process clearly proceeds over 
almost one century. Referring to Bairoch’s estimations18 (1976) it could be hazardous to 
state a crisis in the middle 1800s if a growth in  British per capita GDP of 1.21% per 
annum during 1830-1910 is considered. Anyway decomposing the period 1830-1910 and 
comparing British performances with other economies, particularly those of Germany and 
US, the downward trend in Great Britain accumulation process is appreciated. Following 
Bairoch (1976) again, it arises that in 1830-1860 per capita income grew in Great Britain 
of 1.54% per annum and in Germany of 1.19%. From 1860 till I World War British 
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economy grew hardly of 0.97% and the German one of 1.39%. It is clear the slowing 
down of Great Britain on one hand and the catching up of Germany on the other. The 
pace is actually valuable considering that in 1830 German per capita income was 
approximately 71% of British one, while in 1910 it reached more than 78%.  The loss of 
world leadership of Great Britain is more evident comparing the British growth with the 
US one. Maddison estimations19 (2002) suggest that US GDP in 1820 was 37.5% of 
British one, in 1850 it was 70.2%,  in 1870 it was equal. A clear proof of British fall is 
provided by Crafts, Leybourne and Mills20 (1991) who show that growth trend of 
industrial production, starting from middle 1850s till I World war, decreases21.  
We will provide a new proof of long run British fall estimating the trend of GDP growth 
rate. We will use here the compromise estimate of GDP by Feinstein22 (1972) and we will 
apply to it the Hodrick-Prescott Filter(HP)23.  Our results show a mild downward trend of 
British GDP growth rate over 1855-1913; only after 1899 it slows down  dramatically. 
The growth of the structural component in 1899-1913 is lower than 1855-1899 of hardly 
half point percent per annum. In a recent work Solomou and Ristuccia24 (2002) got 
similar findings. We will report here below a comparison between our estimates obtained 
through HP filter and the Solomou and Ristuccia ones applying Kalman Filter to the same 
series.  
 
Table 1 
 
In order to estimate the trend in GDP growth rate, the use of different methodologies does 
not substantially modify the findings. Both confirm the tendency of GDP growth rate to 
fall over time, suggesting that no structural break exists in the pace of British economy in 
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1899-1913. Re-estimating the growth rate of industrial production index through the HP 
Filter, we get one more ingredient, useful to demonstrate the British fall.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Macroeconomic analysis points out a declining growth rate, from 1840 onward, due to a 
progressive decreasing of investments and to a remarkable reduction of public 
expenditure relative to national expenditure25 and to a downward trend in labour 
productivity growth26.  
 
Table 2 
 
In such a framework, the accumulated wealth in British economy looked tried to get a  
best location abroad. The pace of overseas investments was a natural outcome of the trend 
in economic growth and of the role of Great Britain in the world economic context. That 
is just the typical answer of capital to the trend fall of profit rate. When returns for 
different uses of capital decrease, capital moves where its own yields are higher, 
independently from its destination, being this Indian and American railways or 
exploitations of Latin American and African raw materials. Anyway, economic 
evaluation has to face with further elements. That’s why is not possible to neglect that 
capital movement from Great Britain was influenced by the existence of protected 
colonial markets and by the working international monetary system.  
Four elements seem to be significant to determine the flow of overseas investments: the 
relative fall of British economic leadership, differences between home and foreign 
returns, colonialism and international monetary system. Thereafter, the linkage with  the 
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decreasing trend in growth rate of real GDP will be analyzed. For this purpose we will use 
the overseas investments estimations provided by Imlah, as indicated in section 3. Since 
that involves still a long run investigation, the series in real value will be filtered with the 
usual HP filter. As it showed in figure 3, an inverse correlation of the trend growth rate of 
overseas investments with trend growth rate of GDP is appreciated. This means that when 
Great Britain was on way to lose its role of world leader, a piece of national wealth tried 
to get  best opportunities abroad. 
 
Figure 3 
 
To confirm our conjecture the versus of causal relationship will be tested using Granger 
Causality Test after selecting the appropriate number of lags to be introduced ( See 
appendix 1 tables 2 and 3). 
The results confirm that, in the considered period, the pace of GDP caused the overseas 
investments outflows. This finding, together with a simple correlation coefficient of two 
variables of -0.77, actually  allows the consideration of the real GDP as a crucial element 
in the explanation of overseas investments, as stated by several push theorists, even if on 
other basis.    
 
5 Bimetallism and gold Standard during colonial age. 
Monetary events over nineteenth century can be summarized by the shift from 
bimetallism to gold based monometallic system. Formerly in 1816 Great Britain took on 
de jure Gold Standard and in 1820 established the gold convertibility of its currency. In 
the rest of Europe, for the most part, countries adopted bimetallic system; others, such as 
India, were settled on silver standard, other countries like US, were on bimetallism. In the 
 11 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, the major European countries were converted into 
pure Gold Standard. Step by Step between 1873 and 1892, Germany, Scandinavian 
Countries, Holland, Austria-Hungary, Latin Union born in 1865 ( France, Italy, Belgium 
and Switzerland) adopted Gold Standard and India and US in the last 1890s as well. A 
unified international payments system occurred. Generalized shift to Gold stimulated  
capital movements of major countries, mainly Great Britain. During the cotemporary 
presence of Silver and Gold standard British capital outflows were substantial as well. 
Monetary stability was and still remains a key factor, since it defines an encouraging 
environment for capital flows. During bimetallic age the constancy of silver price relative 
to gold encouraged capital movements worldwide. International bimetallism satisfied a 
plenty of interests as it is clearly evident  from De Cecco27 (1979) who, referring to 
French case, notes that: ‘la casa Rotschild, per bocca dei propri direttori, dichiarò il suo 
appoggio al doppio standard’.  
The stability of silver-gold ratio was encouraged by a cooperation between Bank of 
England and Banque de France by mean of joint measures, sometimes based on common 
accords, as during English banking crisis in 1836 and 1839 and during the French one in 
1847, sometimes accidentally when  gold mines were discovered in California (1849) and 
Australia  (1851)28.  
Only when a decreasing in silver price occurred, bimetallism was dismissed. Two main 
events determined the falling in the relative price of silver in respect to Gold: discovering 
of new silver mines, and overall, adoption of Gold by Germany which was in its take-off 
phase. The associated effect of an increase in silver supply and of pressure on demand for 
gold caused a lowering in silver price and its dismissing by many countries as reserve 
bullion. 
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The pace of overseas investments is closely related to international monetary events. As it 
has been noted above, until 1873 Great Britain was on Gold Standard and other countries 
on bimetallic system. In this context the relative price of silver in respect to Gold did not 
vary, a part from slight fluctuations, the systems cooperated and overseas investments 
grew at a trend rate of 8% per annum. During monetary transition, from 1873 to 1892, 
Gold Standard was adopted by an increasing number of countries, except for India and 
US, the silver price lowered, the rise of nationalism smashed cooperation and a new form 
of protectionism prevailed in trade relationships; that’s why overseas investments slowed 
down, growing just at 2.7% per annum. Finally in 1892-1913 Gold Standard is worldwide 
accepted, India and US converted to gold as well; that implied cooperation and closer 
relationships among countries and British capital outflows grew at 5.25% yearly.  
Tightening our analysis to Indian experience, linkage between its monetary proceedings 
and British overseas investments is much closer because of colonial relationship. From 
monetary unification of India, occurred in 1835, the value of rupee remained unchanged: 
about 24 pence at least until silver price respect to gold was around 15:1. The rupee 
depreciation was an outcome of silver price falling, since India was on Silver standard. 
When this system was dismissed in 1892, a period of fluctuating exchange rates between 
rupee and pound took place till adoption of Gold Standard in  the late of 1890s, which 
signed out a fixed exchange rate with one pound at 16 rupees. This level was maintained, 
as Goldsmith suggests, thanks to ‘ the willingness, never expressed in statutory form, of 
the Government of India to buy or sell London (sterling) funds and, with some limitations, 
gold sovereigns or bullion at very close to the ratio of 15 rupees for pound sterling’29. 
The stability of Indian currency was a device to aid English investments in that colony. 
Colonialism became more palpable in early 1890s, when Great Britain realized that goods 
produced in native land were going to give up on European and North-American markets 
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because of US and Germany competition. Colonies were an useful outlet market for non 
competitive  products of British industries. Just from 1892 onward the growth rate of 
British export raised for effect of colonialist dispositions (figure 4), guaranteeing the 
survival of British industry, despite of its technological relative decline. 
 
Figure 4 
 
The joint effect of increasing in exports and, overall, in overseas investments  allowed 
Great Britain to go on in draining bullions so consolidating its role of exchanges world 
ruler; role covered during bimetallism as well.  
The bullions draining pattern becomes clearer considering capital as a commodity. 
Accumulated monetary wealth in Great Britain, substantially potential capital, shifted 
abroad through overseas investments. Once in the destination economy, it changed in 
commodities, stocks, bonds or securities, and came back to Great Britain, mainly in the 
shape of bullions, increased in value. Likewise, British exports allow to get bullions 
which nourished the creation of domestic monetary capital.   
These circuits were able to work by mean of international monetary stability; such a 
stability was warranted all nineteenth century long till I World War. Till silver-gold ratio 
remained unchanged, the two standards coexist, when an excess of demand of gold and 
silver overproduction caused the fall of relative price in disadvantage of silver, pure Gold 
Standard enforced. British overseas investments, as it has seen above, slowed down 
during the monetary transition period, 1873-1892, and they accelerated between 1893 and 
1914 when Gold Standard became a worldwide accepted system, with  addition of India 
and US.  
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Next section tries to draw bullions draining pattern from India that, in its turn, drained 
bullions from the rest of the World, as showed by its export surplus. It does not matter if 
this draining process involved silver, during gold-silver ratio stability,  or gold, after the 
forced adoption of Gold Standard by India.  
 
6 All That Glitters is Gold. 
In the analysis of British foreign investments, monetary proceedings and colonialism, 
though apparently unrelated, appear as an unicum. Great Britain guaranteed for itself, it 
has seen in section 5, the selling in India of non competitive products for quality and 
price, trying to avoid, or at least, to limit the overproduction crisis viewed in section 4. 
So, that monetary stability was compulsory to India and other dominions. The ratio of 
this strategy is quite clear: India, having a surplus in balance of trade over 1870-1913, 
became a reserve of money (bullions). This money arrived in Great Britain by mean of 
British export incomes, ready to be reinvested  abroad and at home as well. Stability of 
monetary system warranted in this way accumulation of these capitals which were pushed 
abroad as direct or portfolio investments30.   
The role of exports in creating internal liquidity and, we say potential capital, is 
confirmed by regression of A. G. Ford31 who relates disposable liquidity (Y) to exports 
(X) and issue of money (M). 
Yt = 15.52 + 1.18  Xt                                                                                                                     (3) 
Rc2 = 0.60 
Yt = 5.77 + 1.56  Mt                                                                                                                        (4) 
Rc2 = 0.22 
It is to be stressed that relationship between liquidity and exports is more consistent than 
that between liquidity and issued money;  so money draining from abroad, through 
exports, was more relevant for creation of money.  
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Now there are all the elements to evaluate the pace of overseas investments in the 
considered period: trend growth rate of GDP, discussed in section 4, difference in foreign 
and home returns32 and colonialism, which is narrowly tied to monetary happenings and, 
chiefly, to adoption of Gold Standard by India. This last element is picked up by Indian 
net export33. The results of regression analysis is reported below ( for details see 
Appendix 1 table 4). 
gr_imlah = 0.25 -11.76*gr_gdp -0.0068*dret +0.62*gr_iexp                                         (5) 
The outcomes show the simultaneous agreement of push and pull theories ( the 
coefficients of growth rate of GDP and that of the differential of returns are both 
meaningful), though the first one seems to have a more important role to explain overseas 
investments. The main new result is the importance of monetary happenings, signally 
monetary stability, and colonialism captured by meaningfulness  of Indian net export.  
To summarize overseas investments depend on: 
• inversely on Growth rate of GDP, confirming the existence of pushing capital 
abroad. 
• directly on difference between home and foreign returns, sustaining soundness of 
attraction theories (pull). 
• directly on monetary stability, interpreted by Indian net export, key factor to allow 
for bullions accumulation at home. 
 
7 Conclusions 
Overseas investments were certainly the macroeconomic factor that typified the period of 
British Empire fall from a qualitative point of view. Before determining their foundations, 
the major complexity is related to quantification of those outflows. Several difficulties are 
involved in that data mining; so the two main relevant approaches, indirect and direct, 
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encountered several questions. Anyway, though different logical starting points, the two 
methods are not substantially different in terms of quantitative results, as we 
demonstrated in section 3.  
This step, basic from a methodological view, allows to undertake a rigorous analysis of 
the reasons of British overseas investments in the period before I World War. Starting 
from the state of art of the literature, unduly constrained to sharp-cut and alternate 
distinction between pull and push causes, new elements can be added to the theory. 
Though accepting differential between home and foreign returns as a obvious factor 
determining the pace of overseas investments, the first outcome of this work suggests that 
the long run falling of GDP growth rate is a key element as well. So the push and pull 
theories are not alternative.  
The second relevant result raised from monetary events, mainly international monetary 
stability and the adoption of Gold Standard by India.  
The peculiar status of India, on a surplus of trade balances, allows Great Britain to drain 
money, overall bullions, that solely when stable and sound could be attractive for British 
capital. By mean of Colonialism, Great Britain was able, on one hand, to influence 
critically Indian monetary policy, determining the transition to Gold Standard and its 
currency stability, and, on the other hand, to impose purchasing of British manufactures, 
no more competitive, paid earlier in silver and afterwards in gold. In this way money-
commodity, potential capital, could to be transformed in productive capital abroad or at 
home and circulate again in the shape of money, so closing its natural cycle.  
Despite of the obvious agreement of push and pull theories, the stability of money has to 
be added to carry out a complete analysis of the overseas investments. Such a stability 
warranted the realization of natural cycle of capital, tempering  its own crisis at least till I 
World War. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Table 1 –Wald test on Autoregressive Coefficients 
 
Imlaha = C(1) +C(2)*AR(1) 
Simonb = C(3) +C(4)*AR(1) 
Null Hypotesis: C(2)=C(4) 
Chi-squared 0.098998        p-value 0.753035 
 
a: Logarithm of the overseas investments from Imlah (1958)  
b: Logarithm of the overseas investments from Simon (1967)  
 
 
Table 2 – VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: gr_imlah a gr_gdpb  
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  314.5907 NA   1.27E-08 -12.50363 -12.42715 -12.47451 
1  445.8535  246.7740  7.84E-11 -17.59414 -17.36470 -17.50677 
2  572.8609  228.6133  5.72E-13 -22.51444 -22.13203 -22.36881 
3  634.1228  105.3704  5.81E-14 -24.80491 -24.26954 -24.60104 
4  647.6741   22.22414*   3.98E-14*  -25.18696*  -24.49864*  -24.92484* 
5  649.6178  3.032226  4.35E-14 -25.10471 -24.26342 -24.78434 
6  650.7493  1.674529  4.93E-14 -24.98997 -23.99572 -24.61135 
7  655.5937  6.782148  4.83E-14 -25.02375 -23.87653 -24.58688 
8  662.7558  9.454102  4.33E-14 -25.15023 -23.85006 -24.65512 
a: Long period component of the growth rate of overseas investments applying HP Filter 
to Imlah (1958) 
b: Long period component of the growth rate of Gdp applying HP Filter to Feinstein 
(1972) 
 
Table 3 - Var Granger causality test. 
Dependent variable: gr_imlah a 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
gr_gdp  15.08447 4  0.0045 
All  15.08447 4  0.0045 
    
Dependent variable: gr_gdpb 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
tc_imlah  4.766551 4  0.3121 
All  4.766551 4  0.3121 
a: Long period component of the growth rate of overseas investments applying HP Filter 
to Imlah (1958) 
b: Long period component of the growth rate of Gdp applying HP Filter to Feinstein 
(1972) 
 
 
 18 
Table 4 –Estimation of the reasons of Overseas Investments 
Dependent Variable: gr_imlah a 
Method: Two-Stage Least Square 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
gr_gdp b -11.7599 2.799201 -4.201148 0.0002 
dret c 0.006827 0.002713 2.51639 0.0166 
gr_iexp d 0.616464 0.147489 4.179717 0.0002 
C 0.250211 0.051766 4.833491 0.0000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.868623  Durbin-Watson 1.187166 
Instrument list: tc_imlah (-1), tc_gdp (-1), dret(-1), tc_iexp (-1). 
 
a: Long period component of the growth rate of overseas investments applying HP Filter 
to Imlah (1958) 
b: Long period component of the growth rate of Gdp applying HP Filter to Feinstein 
(1972)  
c: Difference between total overseas and total home returns from Edelstein (1976) 
Appendix 3 
d: Long period component of the growth rate of Indian net export applying HP Filter to 
Statistical Abstract cit. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Overseas Investments by Simon and Imlah 
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Source: Imlah (1958) e Simon (1976). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Gdp and Industrial Production Index. Trend Growth Rates obtained using HPF 
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a. tc_gdp_hp: Long period component of the growth rate of Gdp applying HP Filter 
to Feinstein (1972) 
b. tc_ipi_hp:  Long period component of the growth rate of Ipi applying HP Filter to 
Crafts and Hurley (1993, TA3.1) 
Source: Our elaboration on Feinstein (1972, T18) and Crafts and Hurley (1993, TA3.1)  
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Figure 3 – Gdp (right axes) and Overseas Investments (left axes). Trend Growth Rates 
obtained using HPF  
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a. tc_imlah_hp: Long period component of the growth rate of overseas investments 
applying HP Filter to Imlah (1958) 
b. tc_gdp_hp: Long period component of the growth rate of Gdp applying HP Filter 
to Feinstein (1972) 
Source: Our elaboration on Imlah (1958), Feinstein (1972, T18) 
 
Figure 4 – British Export. Trend Growth Rates obtained using HPF  
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Source: Our elaboration on Feinstein (1972, T18) 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 – Estimations of growth rate of GDP by Solomou-Ristuccia and our estimations 
(annual %) 
years Sol. & Ris. a Oursb 
   
1856-1864 - 1.87 
1864-1876 2.2 2.08 
1876-1887 1.57 1.78 
1887-1899 2.63 2.14 
1899-1910 0.97 1.54 
a: Long period component of the growth rate of Gdp applying Kalman Filter to original 
data 
b: Long period component of the growth rate of Gdp applying HP Filter to original data 
Sources: Solomou, R. and Ristuccia C.A., British episodic cit. and our elaborations of 
Gdp compromise estimates by Feinstein (1972) 
 
Table 2 –Economic Growth Key variables in Europe and Great Britain. 
 1840 1870 1899 1910 
 GB  Eu norm GB  Eu norm GB  Eu norm GB  Eu norm 
Inv/natexpa  %  10.5 14.4 8.5 17.2 7.3 18.6 7 19.5 
Gov/natexpb % 7.9 7 4.8 6.3 5.9 5.9 8.2 5.7 
a: Ratio of Domestic investments on National Expenditure. 
b: Ratio of Governmental Expenditure on National Expenditure. 
Source: Crafts (1985) T3.6, pag. 62-63. 
 
 
